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Despite repeated appointments of technocratic governments in Europe and increasing 
interest in technocracy, there is little knowledge regarding citizens’ attitudes 
towards technocracy and the idea of governance by unelected experts. This article 
revisits normative debates and hypothesises that technocracy and democracy stand 
in a negative relationship in the eyes of European citizens. It tests this alongside a 
series of hypotheses on technocratic attitudes combining country-level institutional 
characteristics with individual survey data. While findings confirm that individual 
beliefs about the merits of democracy influence technocratic attitudes, two 
additional important factors  are  also  identified: first, levels of trust in current 
representative political institutions also motivate technocratic preferences; second, 
historical legacies, in terms of past party-based authoritarian regime experience, can 
explain significant cross-national variation. The implications of the findings are 
discussed in the broader context of citizen orientations towards government, elitism 
and the mounting challenges facing representative democracy. 
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In recent years questions have been raised on citizens’ attitudes to existing polit- ical 
institutions that make up democratic landscapes. The majority of scholarly articles has 
concentrated on the ‘classical’ institutions and actors, such as parties, governments, and 
local authorities, and has mourned the erosion of citizen trust and support for those 
representative institutions (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Caramani 2016; 
Dalton 2004; Norris 2011). There has also been a resur- gent interest in the rise of 
populism, populist discourse and populist extreme parties, both on the right and on 
the left of the political spectrum (Akkerman et al. 2014; Tronconi 2015; 
Vasilopoulou et al. 2014). However, less research has focused on the topic of 
technocracy and people’s attitudes towards technocrats, 
 
even though repeated appointments of technocratic cabinets have brought the topic 
under considerable media and academic attention (Begg 2011; Economist 2011; 
Habermas 2015; Incerti 2011; Odugbemi, 2011; Pastorella 2015). What is 
particularly missing is an understanding of how citizens view technocracy and how 
their support for this type of decision-making is shaped by individual and contextual 
factors. This article proposes the notion of technocratic attitudes and develops specific 
hypotheses drawn from the stealth democracy literature and beyond, on both 
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 individual and country-level determinants of citizens’ favourable orientations 
towards technocracy. Its aim is to test in a comparative approach whether the narrative 
of a negative relation between technocracy and democracy holds for European citizens, 
and whether additional contextual fac- tors, such as the trustworthiness of the political 
players and historical legacies, play a role in the formulation of such attitudes. 
Overall, the article wants to add empirical analysis to the growing norma- tive 
debate regarding the opposing political forces of technocracy, democracy and 
populism, and analyse with quantitative survey data how the relationships develop at 
the level of European peoples. The focus of this article is placed on better 
understanding citizens’ orientation towards technocracy defined as inde- pendent, 
expert-driven political decision-making, in contrast to governance by popularly 
elected officials. Due to current data availability, our investigation of the attitudes of 
European citizens towards technocracy refers to the period prior to the euro crisis. 
We would expect that, following the appointment of a host of technocratic leaders 
and cabinets at the helm of European countries since 2009, those attitudes may have 
evolved. We revisit the potential implica- tions of technocratic governance 
experiences, economic recession and financial austerity since the onset of the euro 
crisis in the latter part of the article. The present analysis provides the first 
examination of technocratic attitudes and the first such comparative study across 
European countries. We hope it will form the basis for further research into 
technocratic attitudes, adding a new dimension to the current literature on the rising 
scepticism towards institutions of representative democracy and growing citizen 
interest in alternative models of governance. 
 
Democracy, technocracy and the people: a string of 
contested relationships? 
It is commonly argued that the power of technocrats ‒ that is, experts acquiring and 
exercising political power (Burnham 1942) ‒ is inversely proportional to that of 
democratically elected politicians, so that if the former increases the latter 
decreases. This is also the view of more recent scholars who see the tech- nocratic 
mode of taking decisions as an impediment to democracy (Fischer 1990). Shapiro 
succinctly laments ‘the inevitable tension between democratic control of public 
policy … and regulation by experts’ (Shapiro 2005: 343). In other words, according 
to the majority of scholars, technocracy and democracy stand in a negative relationship. 
There are, however, some isolated voices arguing that technocracy and 
democracy might be compatible, even necessary to each other. Schudson 
(2006), for instance, argues that democrats should incorporate a more forgiv- ing 
view of the role of expertise in democracy and others have suggested that the de-
politicisation of policy-making might even be a positive democratic feature (Pettit 
2004). Williams (2006) goes as far as arguing that technocracy can lead to 
democratic externalities and, more recently, Rosanvallon (2011) agreed that the 
impartial legitimacy of technocratic non-majoritarian insti- tutions might be a 
necessity ‒ and part and parcel of ‒ democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, while 
many acknowledge that skills and expertise are part of what Fearon (1999) called a 
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 ‘good-type’ of politician, it is the lack of experts’ accountability that presents 
serious problems for the notion of representative democracy (Mansbridge 2003). 
These theoretical debates are a good starting point to assess what may shape 
citizens’ attitudes towards technocracy. Since such political attitudes remain 
relatively unexplored and little qualitative work exists on this issue, we pro- ceed 
with caution in investigating the notion of technocratic attitudes and what exactly 
citizens have in mind when they are asked to consider ‘technoc- racy’. Many people 
in Europe might think of technocratic governments and appointments of experts to 
key political posts,1 some might use central banks as a reference point, while still 
others may think of European Union civil serv- ants – often labelled Eurocrats – or 
even national civil service bureaucracies. Despite this diversity, we believe there to be 
an underlying orientation directed at political power and decision-making, which 
does not derive from popular selection and the political processes of party 
competition and elections, but from technical expertise. 
Therefore, we would expect that citizens’ view of technocrats is influenced by 
their overall approach to representative democratic governance. In accord- ance with 
the normative analysis presented above, citizens’ attitudes to tech- nocracy and 
democracy would stand in a negative relation, so that if citizens truly believe 
democratically elected representatives provide the best basis for a political system, 
they will not see technocrats in a favourable light. The cur- rent literature on 
citizens’ policy preferences for expert/non-partisan-based governance, or ‘stealth 
democracy’, as it has been conceptualised, is geograph- ically limited and has 
occasionally brought forth contradictory results. Stealth democracy can be defined 
as a decision-making process where decisions are taken ‘efficiently, objectively and 
without commotion or disagreement’ (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002: 143). 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) found that US citizens would rather see their 
democracy led by impartial experts or busi- nessmen than being involved in it and 
seeing its workings too closely in their daily lives. Scholars have identified similar 
patterns of rising support for stealth democracy in Finland (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009) 
and the Netherlands (Coffé and Michels 2014), mainly to be found among less 
satisfied, less politically trusting and less educated citizens. However, the same 
works simultaneously find growing support for alternative forms of politics, in 
particular more direct democracy and citizen involvement. There is little 
comparative evidence on such preferences and national-specific studies show 
increased citizen support for both direct and technocratic modes of governance as 
the alternative to representative ones (Webb 2013).2 
As a further antipode to this tension between representative democracy and 
technocracy, scholars are increasingly turning their attention to the relation between 
citizen attitudes towards independent experts and populist attitudes (Akkerman et al. 
2014; Caramani 2016; Hawkins et al. 2012). Efforts to define populism and populist 
attitudes of citizenries have led to a theory of a thin ideology or discourse that 
describes ‘elitism’ as its mirror image (Mudde 2004: 543). Although ‘elites’ are not 
defined explicitly in this discourse, they include ‘evil’ business elites, the political 
establishment and independent experts, which are then juxtaposed to the ‘good’ people 
(Akkerman et al. 2014). The authors are quick to point that there are some similarities 
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 between populism and elitism, both theoretical and empirical. One similarity is the 
emphasis on charismatic and strong leadership, or the division of the political world 
into a force of ‘good and right’ and a force of ‘evil, corrupt and wrong’. As a case in 
point, those studies that have tested measures of political attitudes among citizens 
have found a positive – not negative – relationship between populism and elitism 
(as attitudes towards experts) (Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012). 
This points to a misapprehension of citizen attitudes towards technocrats. Firstly, 
placing independent technocratic expertise in the same category as the existing 
political establishment of a democracy goes against the aforementioned tension between 
technocrats and a political system’s representative democratic machine. Technocratic 
attitudes entail support for people who have not been chosen by voters, through the 
existing political parties and following the present system of electoral competition. In 
other words, in so far as attitudes towards technocrats are elitist, they encompass 
only a specific part of a society’s elite (such as a ‘knowledge elite’) and stand in 
contrast to the current political elite, political parties, the legislature and their ways of 
‘politics as usual’. At the same time, a preference for independent expertise also entails a 
belief that the people are unable to select worthy decision-makers through the 
current democratic system. 
Therefore, we argue that in addition to overall beliefs about the merits of 
democracy as a regime, perceptions of the political class and of the institutions it 
populates are important considerations for citizen views of technocracy. Citizen distrust 
in the political system, in its institutions and its officials will influence the appeal of 
technocracy, as technocrats are contrasted with the elected political class. We know that 
trust is essential for the healthy functioning and legitimacy of any democratic regime, 
creating a reservoir of citizens’ ‘goodwill’ towards the political system, its 
institutions and the political class (Easton 1965), while distrusting attitudes have a 
significant negative effect on citizens’ approach to political processes and their 
subsequent political behaviour (Hetherington 1998, 2005; Levi and Stoker 2000; 
Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Distrust of rep- resentative political institutions marks a 
break between citizens and their rep- resentatives, and existing research has traced 
its impact on citizens’ decision to abstain in elections or to support alternative 
political groups, anti-systemic and radical parties (Belanger and Nadeau 2005; 
Hooghe et al. 2011; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2014). Therefore, citizens who 
perceive their democratically elected governments and institutions to be 
untrustworthy may redirect their attention to technocracy, as an alternative mode of 
decision-making by officials who are selected based on their expertise and not 
elected by the majority of the citizens. 
 
Individual-level hypotheses 
As mentioned above, we expect that citizens’ preference for technocracy will 
depend on their attitudes towards the democratic institutions and players in their 
political system and on their attitudes towards electoral democracy as a mode of 
governance. Those who are unconvinced about the benefits of democ- racy as a regime 
and are distrustful of political institutions will be more likely to express a positive 
 4 
 attitude towards technocracy. The first hypothesis concerns citizens’ beliefs about 
and support for representative democracy as a political system and can be formulated 
as follows: 
H1(a) More positive attitudes towards democracy as a regime and as a way of governance 
will lead to more negative attitudes to technocracy. 
We expect that political trust or distrust of political institutions has an 
additional influence on citizens’ attitudes towards technocracy. A series of 
untrustworthy governments and institutional players may increase the 
attractiveness of independent experts, irrespective of a citizen’s beliefs about the 
merits of electoral democracy, whereas trust in the officials and insti- tutions of 
the political system render technocrats unnecessary, or worse, disruptive to the 
chain of representation and accountability. We focus spe- cifically on trust in 
representative political institutions (national parlia- ments and national 
governments) and political parties, as these provide the link between the idea 
of representative democracy through elections and citizens. Citizens who trust 
elected officials and institutions to act in a competent manner and for the good of 
the community are more likely to be suspicious of unelected decision-making. If 
this trust is lost, however, citizens might shift their preferences towards 
technocratic governance. Hence we would expect that: 
H1(b) Higher citizen trust in representative democratic political institutions would lead 
to more negative attitudes toward technocracy. 
While the hypotheses above could apply to any political system, there is 
something quite specific about political attitudes of citizens in the countries ana- lysed in 
this study, where the interaction between technocracy and democracy plays out more 
strongly: their belonging to the European Union. Technocracy is often associated with 
the EU as ‘the organisation which has perhaps more than any other faced accusations 
on account of the role of technocratic functions and expertise in its workings’ (Craig 
2014: 32; also see Harcourt and Radaelli 1999). The ongoing debate over the EU’s 
democratic deficit includes references to the technocratic nature of the EU, which 
delegitimises it and distances citizens. The EU, as a hybrid between a technocratic 
independent body and a democratic polity, is the ideal place to assess how the views of 
citizens toward the EU might influence or change one’s attitudes towards technocracy. 
The expectation is that a citizen who trusts the EU would be familiar, com- 
fortable with ‒ and indeed positively oriented towards ‒ the idea of expert 
decision-making, thus having more favourable attitudes towards technocracy. 
Although at the individual level research has shown that trusting attitudes towards 
national and European political levels tend to reinforce each other (Rohrschneider 
2002), studies such as Rothstein (2003) and Kritzinger (2003) provide evidence that 
citizens are able to evaluate different political institutions separately. If, moreover, the 
EU 3 is perceived by voters as acting behind the scenes to influence the appointment 
of technocratic national actors, this may reinforce existing convictions that 
technocracy and the EU are linked, and render the association between attitudes to 
technocracy and attitudes to the EU even stronger. Overall a positive relationship 
between trust in the EU and favourable technocratic attitudes (and vice versa) is to be 
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 expected.4 
H1(c) Citizens with higher trust in the EU will show a more favourable attitude towards 
technocracy. 
In our individual-level analysis we include a series of control variables: cit- izens’ 
ideological self-placement on a left‒right scale, age and gender. We also include two 
control variables derived directly from the stealth democracy lit- erature: that is, 
education and political interest. Both have been shown to be negatively correlated 
with support for stealth democracy (Coffé and Michels 2014; Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2002). We would expect that the more active and interested a citizen is in 
politics, the less s/he will approve of delegating deci- sion-making to ‘unelected 
technocrats’ (Kurki 2011). In addition, we expect that older citizens, having been 
socialised in an earlier period with stronger parties and partisan ties, will also be 
negative towards technocratic decision-making. 
 6 
  
Country-level  hypotheses 
We also maintain that different contextual characteristics in the countries under 
study will have an impact on the formation and expression of citizens’ attitudes 
towards technocracy. Given the limited comparative research avail- able, we rely on 
the same mechanism outlined above and expect technocracy to be seen more 
positively in countries where the political system is not sta- ble or not fully 
established, and where governments are performing poorly in ensuring the well-
being of their citizens. From these general assumptions two related hypotheses can be 
developed. The first concerns the pervasiveness of corruption. Corruption has been 
shown to diminish political trust dramatically (Van Biezen and Molenaar 2012) and 
rules to reduce or avoid corruption are premised precisely on the concern that 
political corruption undermines public confidence in politics (Ziller and Schübel 
2015). We expect the poor quality of democratic systems due to corruption to make 
technocracy a more appealing alternative to citizens, and therefore to have a 
positive effect on individual support for technocratic decision-making.5 
H2(a) In countries with higher levels of corruption, citizens will tend to have more 
positive attitudes towards technocracy. 
We also expect that if citizens are dissatisfied with economic outputs, they will 
assign responsibility to the partisan political class and will, therefore, be more likely 
to accept, or even prefer, technocratic decision-making to improve the situation. 
Citizens tend to judge their political system not solely based on political and 
democratic standards, but also on their economic reality and the performance of 
the government (Gavin and Sanders 1997; Wagner 2011). Existing research on the 
appointment of technocratic ministers shows that negative economic conditions 
and fear of the markets increase the likelihood of technocrats and independents 
entering the cabinet (Halleberg and Wehner 2013; Neto and Strøm 2006). Therefore: 
H2(b) In countries with more difficult economic conditions, citizens will tend to have 
more positive attitudes towards technocracy. 
Finally, we believe that a key factor in shaping widespread attitudes towards 
technocracy lies in the specifics of national political culture and, in particular, in past 
experiences or alternative forms of government to the one which can be broadly 
labelled as ‘liberal representative democracy’. We expect that past community 
experiences influence the meaning and perception of democracy and alternative 
regime types among citizens. Two such types could be con- sidered to leave a 
legacy in terms of peoples’ attitudes to technocracy as an alternative to partisan 
democracy and are relevant for our analysis of European countries: the experience of 
communism, as party-based authoritarian rule, and the experience of technocratic 
government appointments, as a manifestation of political rule by unelected experts. 
We will consider each of them in turn. 
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The newer post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
have attracted considerable scholarly attention in an effort to study the social, 
institutional and political legacy of communist rule (Mishler and Rose 2001; White 
et al. 2013). Distrust towards parties and politics in general is found to be 
widespread in many post-communist societies, where citizenries are highly 
suspicious of politicians and the political institutions born out of the transition period 
are considered to fall short of citizen expectations (Ekman and Linde 2005). 
Because technocracy can be presented as an alternative to party-centred 
democratic governance, we would expect that citizens of post-communist states 
should hold more favourable attitudes towards this mode of decision-making. We remain 
cautious in identifying the precise mechanism behind this and suggest two possible 
explanations. Favourable attitudes towards un-elected experts could be motivated by 
negative perceptions of political par- ties and politicians as a class and fuelled by the 
experience of authoritarian party-based rule. At the same time, it is possible that an 
opposite mechanism is at play and that, in the minds of citizens, un-elected 
technocrats represent a mode of governance that is indeed more similar to the 
communist experience in its lack of citizen involvement, political selection and 
plethora of parties and in its general emphasis on expertise. Therefore, attitudes 
could be motivated by ‘communist nostalgia’, whether based on principles or on 
assessments of ailing current political outputs (Ekman and Linde 2005; Haerpfer 
2003). If the latter mechanism dominates, we should be able to observe bigger 
differences among the older and younger generations in these countries, with older 
citizens being more favourable towards technocracy based on early socialisation during 
communist rule and the process of learning regime support. 
H3(a) If a country has had experience of party-based authoritarian rule, in the shape 
of communism, its citizens will be more likely to report more positive attitudes 
towards technocracy. 
It is important to note that we are interested in citizen attitudes towards 
technocracy in the widest sense of expert, non-democratically elected, political 
decision-making. However, technocracy is also manifested in specific types of 
technocratic governments ‒ that is, cabinets where the prime ministers and/ or 
ministers are independent, non-partisan figures (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). 
Such an alternative form of government experience is expected to influ- ence citizen 
attitudes towards the more ‘diffuse’ idea of technocracy, which is the one 
employed so far in the analysis. We investigate whether there is a ‘technocracy 
addiction’ effect, whereby once citizens who have experience of technocratic 
governments are more likely to be positive towards technocrats in the future, making it 
less of an affront to normal cabinet appointment. If that is the case, we expect a 
positive association: 
H3(b )If a country has had experience of technocratic governments its citizens will be 
more likely to report positive attitudes towards technocracy. 
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Data and methods 
The hypotheses developed above will be tested using data from the 2008 
European Values Survey (hereafter EVS) for all EU member countries exclud- ing 
Croatia (27 in total). We are aware that using data restricted to one year is limiting, as 
there is no possibility to observe the evolution of the phenomenon over time, but we 
still think that the results will be informative as they will provide a snapshot of 
attitudes and motivations, and will constitute a good basis for further comparative 
studies of attitudes towards technocracy as newer data is collected.6 
The dependent variable we use to capture citizen attitudes towards technoc- racy is 
phrased in the EVS as: 
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about 
each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? 
 
Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country.7 
Substantively, the choice of this variable rests on the assumption that respond- ents 
interpret this question as referring to technocracy ‒ that is, experts taking policy 
decisions and governing within the framework of their national political context.8 We 
assume respondents think of technocracy in this way probed by the question, 
which precisely references ‘this country’. As mentioned ear- lier, attitudes towards 
technocracy may be linked to considerations of various technocratic actors, from the 
civil service, policy sphere or European levels. Nevertheless, we believe it captures 
orientations towards the idea of unelected experts exercising political power at the 
national level. We use the four response categories in our descriptive analyses below, 
but collapse the four categories into two, using the dichotomous dependent variable in 
subsequent analysis to ease interpretation of our results.9 
Individual-level explanatory variables are also taken from the EVS. We 
measure democratic attitudes using an index of four items asking about the 
effectiveness of democracy in maintaining a good economy and social order, its 
decisiveness and overall advantages as a form of government. Our choice of this 
measure is motivated by the need to capture respondents’ overall attitude towards 
democracy as a system of governance that is different from other com- mon 
operationalisation choices, such as democratic satisfaction or evaluation of government, 
which register more specific evaluations of incumbents and more transient attitudes.10 
We also construct an index for political trust in represent- ative institutions, using the 
survey items for trust in national government, in national parliament and in 
political parties. Trust in the European Union is measured using a single item.11 
For the country-level variables, we use the Corruption Perception Index as our 
measure of systemic corruption. We use data from the World Bank 
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for the economic measures of GDP per capita in 2008 and a host of other 
economic indicators, such as unemployment, GDP growth, budget deficit and 
inequality index. The list of technocratic governments is taken from the work of 
McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014). 
In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses for the determinants of tech- nocratic 
attitudes we employ a multilevel binary logistic model. This statistical method allows 
us not only to account for correlated error terms among indi- viduals from the same 
national context, but also to test contextual effects at the country level (Steenbergen 
and Jones 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. country averages for favourable attitudes to technocracy (eVs 2008). 
 10 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of technocratic attitudes (eVs 2008). 
 
Analysis and findings 
Taking a first look at the distribution of positive and negative technocratic 
attitudes across countries as plotted on a European map, it is clear that there is 
considerable variation between the 27 EU countries under investigation. Darker 
shadings in Figure 1 indicate overall more positive attitudes towards technocracy in 
that country. Differences stand out mostly in terms of Eastern and Western Europe, 
with Central and Eastern European countries scoring widespread positive attitudes. 
The distribution of technocratic attitudes pre- sented in Figure 2 also shows 
countries of CEE topping the list, while citizens in Denmark, Sweden, Cyprus and 
Greece register the most widespread negative orientations towards technocratic 
decision-making. Interestingly, the distri- bution of attitudes using 1999 data is 
very similar, both in terms of country 
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Figure 3. country scatterplots – democratic attitudes, trust in the eu and political 
trust. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. country scatterplots – corruption perception index and GDp per capita. 
 
ordering and share of respondents with positive attitudes.12Figure a2. comparing 
positive  attitudes  towards  technocracy  (1999–2008). 
Scatterplots presented in Figure 3 show that at the country level, citizen 
attitudes towards democracy (1) and the average level of political trust (2) have a 
negative relationship to technocratic attitudes. Trust in the EU (3) appears to be 
positively related to favourable technocratic attitudes, though the association is 
considerably weaker. 
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Table 1. Multilevel logistic models using eVs2008 (dependent variable: technocratic attitudes). 
 
null Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Individual-level variables        
Democratic 0.542*** 
 
0.543*** 
 
0.543*** 
 
0.542*** 
 
0.543*** 
 
0.544*** 
 
0.546*** 
 attitude index        political trust 0.475*** 
(0 047) 
0.477*** 
(0 047) 
0.477*** 
(0 047) 
0.475*** 
(0 047) 
0.478*** 
(0 047) 
0.416*** 
(0 048) 
0.478*** 
(0 047) trust in eu 1.128*** 
 
1.127*** 
 
1.127*** 
 
1.128*** 
 
1.127*** 
 
1.129*** 
 
1.127*** 
 political interest 0.912*** 
 
0.912*** 
 
0.912*** 
 
0.912*** 
 
0.912*** 
 
0.914*** 
 
0.910*** 
 lr ideology 1.028*** 
 
1.028*** 
 
1.028*** 
 
1.028*** 
 
1.028*** 
 
1.029*** 
 
1.029*** 
 Male 0.969 (0.027) 0.970 (0.027) 0.970 (0.027) 0.969 (0.027) 0.970 (0.027) 0.970 (0.027) 0.972 (0.027) 
education 0.997 (0.003) 0.997 (0.003) 0.997 (0.003) 0.997 (0.003) 0.997 (0.003) 0.997 (0.003) 0.996 (0.003) 
age 0.996*** 
(0 001) 
0.996*** 
(0 001) 
0.996*** 
(0 001) 
0.996*** 
(0 001) 
0.996*** 
(0 001) 
0.996*** 
(0 001) 
0.995*** 
(0 001) Country-level variables        
cpi (2008)  0.858* (0.071)      
GDppc (2008)   0.999**      tech. government exp.    1.089 (0.341)    communist regime     2.750***  
2.130*** 
 
2.182*** 
 exp. 
Interaction term 1.005***  
(0.002) 
age* communist 
exp. pol. trust* 
communist 
regime exp. 
 
 
 
1.559** (0.296) 
overall intercept 1.418** (0.228)  12.30*** (2.29) 33.16*** (18.65) 21.24*** (5.90) 11.95*** (2.56) 8.439*** (1.55) 8.951*** (1.66) 9.059*** (1.68) 
Random effects estimates (entries are standard deviations of intercept) 
 
country level 0.833 (0.114) 0.765* (0.105) 0.720** 
(0 099) 
0.687*** 
(0 095) 
0.764* (0.105) 0.589*** 
(0 082) 
0.588*** 
(0 082 
0.588*** 
(0 082) icc 0.174 0.151 0.136 0.125 0.152 0.095 0.095 0.095 
observations 26,227 26,227 26,227 26,227 26,227 26,227 26,227 26,227 
number of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
note: Dependent variable technocratic attitudes is dichotomous (0 = negative attitude, 1 = positive attitude). entries are odds ratios, standard errors in 
parentheses. significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
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At the country level, the bivariate associations between corruption control, GDP 
per capita and technocratic attitude are shown in Figure 4 and appear to be in the 
hypothesised direction, with citizens in countries with lower cor- ruption and higher 
GDP per capita reporting more negative attitudes towards technocracy on average, 
although the associations are far from strong. Utilising a single time-point for our 
analysis makes it harder to argue about the impact of worsening financial 
performance, since many of the indicators capture struc- tural economic characteristics 
as much as performance. We discuss the role of economic conditions in more detail in 
the ensuing analysis. 
Given the wide variation in average attitudes towards technocracy in coun- tries, 
we employ a multilevel binary logistic model to test the individual-level hypotheses 
while accounting for the hierarchical structure of the data. In our data, 
approximately 83 per cent of variation in responses is captured at the individual 
level, with a considerable 17 per cent of variation being located at the country level. 
The likelihood ratio test comparing the null multilevel model to a null simple 
regression model also suggests there are significant country effects and the 
appropriate methodological approach is a multilevel model (LR 
= 4579, p < 0.001). The Null Model in Table 1 presents the intercept only model and 
Model 1 introduces the individual-level variables. All of the variables retain their 
statistical significance and direction of the effect on technocratic attitudes even when 
country-level variables are added in Model 2 onwards.13 
The initial hypotheses on the relationship between democratic attitudes and trust in 
representative institutions are supported, with higher scores on the democratic 
attitude index decreasing the odds of supporting technocracy as a political model of 
decision-making. Registering a high score on the demo- cratic attitude index 
decreases one’s odds of reporting favourable technocratic attitudes by about 50 per 
cent. Similarly, and in addition to the effect of general attitudes towards democracy as 
a regime, trust in the country’s representative political institutions (government, 
parliament and political parties) also has a negative and even stronger effect on 
support for technocracy. The hypothesis for individual-level trust in the EU is also 
confirmed. Despite the fact that trusting attitudes are considered to be influenced by 
the same life experiences and personal characteristics, and are thus often positively 
correlated, trust at the EU level has a positive relation with favourable technocratic 
attitudes.14 The relationship between EU trust and technocratic attitudes is weaker, 
but it is in the hypothesised direction, suggesting there is an independent effect of 
orientations towards the EU. This further confirms the suggestion that attitudes towards 
the EU and attitudes towards technocracy might be capturing similar belief systems. 
Predicted probability plots in support of our hypotheses are shown Appendix 3 
(Figure A3). 
Given the limited existing knowledge regarding the possible influences on 
attitudes towards technocracy, it is worth pointing out some of the associations captured 
by our control individual-level variables in Model 2. Political interest 
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has a small negative effect, as hypothesised by the stealth democracy research and age 
has a weak negative effect, with older citizens being less favourable to 
technocracy than the young. We consider these effects to be in line with 
expectations ‒ that is, citizens who express stronger interest in politics and are more 
invested in the political processes of their country are negative towards a system of 
governance that goes against democratic representation and popular election. Similarly, 
older citizens socialised under a different political landscape with stronger party ties (at 
least in Western European countries) should be more sceptical towards political 
decision-making that challenges this form of delegate representation. In addition, the 
more right-leaning citizens are more likely to report favourable attitudes towards 
technocracy. While technocracy can serve left- or right-wing ideologies (Phillips 
2011), studies of Spanish citizens have shown that having a left-wing ideology is a 
key factor to explain lack of sup- port for stealth democracy (Font et al. 2012). In 
general, within and certainly outside Europe, technocrats ‘have been associated with 
orthodox versions of free-market capitalism.15 During the past years, the new 
technocrats in Eastern Europe have also been clearly associated with market economics 
(Fischer 1990). While the link between technocracy and neo-liberal policies16 has no 
inherent validity as such (Centeno 1993), the reality in Western Europe too shows 
that the two often go hand in hand. Such entente has been explained as originating in 
the fact that both place emphasis on productive efficiency. 
Finally, contrary to what is argued by Coffé and Michels (2014), education levels 
in our models do not have a significant influence on attitudes towards technocracy. 
For these scholars, lower levels of perceived political efficacy and satisfaction 
were the main explanation for the correlation between low education and support 
for stealth democracy. However, in our analysis, these mechanisms are better 
captured by the effect of political interest, trust and democratic attitudes. 
Furthermore, Coffé and Michels’ results were based on a survey of Dutch citizens, 
and while single-country studies are valid and use- ful, our Europe-wide analysis 
shows that citizens’ perceptions and preferences might not be the same as in one 
country. In our sample, we do find a nega- tive bivariate association between 
education levels and technocratic attitudes in many Western European countries 
(including the Netherlands), though the association is weak and does not hold for 
Central, Eastern and Southern European countries. 
Looking at the country-level variables in Models 2–8, we find some support for the 
corruption hypothesis, with the corruption perception index having a negative 
effect, but significant only at the 10 per cent level.17 The economic indicator related 
to economic development shows that per capita GDP has a very small negative 
effect, whereas all other indicators related to economic performance do not reach 
statistical significance and are not reported in Table 
1.18 Therefore, though we find that corruption and economic development levels 
have a weak effect on technocratic attitudes, we cannot say the same 
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about economic performance. If additional data from different time points were 
available, we would be better equipped to trace changes in economic performance 
and technocratic attitudes for each country. At this point, the data do provide some 
evidence that these structural conditions undermine the relationship between citizens 
and politicians and are indeed related to citizens reporting a more favourable attitude 
towards technocracy and partially support hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b). 
In Model 4 we fail to find any result for past experience of technocratic 
government (hypothesis 3(b)). While the effect runs in the expected direction (i.e. 
having experienced the technocratic mode of governance improves citizen attitudes to 
technocracy), the variable is not statistically significant. This could be explained by 
the relative crudeness of the dichotomous variable, yet even estimations using the 
distinctions between the different types of technocratic government based on length of 
remit and composition does not yield any signif- icant results.19 We believe this is 
because such operationalisations fail to capture citizens’ experience and perceptions of 
these governments, which would help shape general attitudes towards technocracy. 
Model 5 tests the hypothesis regarding communist legacies for citizen atti- tudes 
towards technocracy. Citizens of countries that experienced Communist Party rule are 
more likely to report a positive attitude towards technocracy, as expected in 
hypothesis 3(a). In fact, the dummy variable captures most of the variation that 
occurs at the country level (the ICC for Model 5 is reduced to 0.095). This effect is 
in line with our expectations, though its influence is greater than anticipated. Further, 
we find that such technocratic preferences are most likely motivated by the negative 
experience of party-based authoritarian rule and the difficulties of establishing 
credible political parties in its aftermath, 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. impact of age on attitudes towards technocracy for different country 
groups. 
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Figure 6. impact of political trust on attitudes towards technocracy for different 
country groups. 
 
rather than a nostalgia for the communist regime. Figure 5 (Model 6) shows that 
respondent age has no significant effect on technocratic attitudes in post- communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the hypothesised effect of age, with 
older people being more likely to disapprove of technocratic decision-making, is only 
true for the remaining European nations, in line with earlier explanations of stronger 
attachments to party-based political processes. Given that we know post-communist 
party legacies in Central and Eastern Europe have made it harder to develop and 
establish citizen‒state trust relations, we also test how citizen distrust shapes attitudes 
towards technocracy in that context. Figure 6 (Model 7) shows that distrust of 
representative institutions does increase citizens’ preference for technocracy across 
all European coun- tries, though citizens in post-communist states are less sensitive to 
individual levels of trust and are consistently more likely to report favourable 
attitudes towards technocracy than their counterparts in Western Europe. This 
suggests that technocratic decision-making is evaluated by citizenries across 
European countries not solely in terms of its potential advantages or disadvantages, 
but also in terms of the solution it may offer to democratic politics. 
It is important to note at this point that, in our analysis, country-level factors are 
considered in turn due to the strong correlations between country indica- tors. 
Therefore, although we find some evidence that control of corruption has a negative 
effect on technocratic attitudes, economic development has a weak negative effect 
and communist legacies have a strong effect, these hypotheses are tested individually. 
As more data on citizen attitudes towards alternative forms of government become 
available we hope to revisit these hypotheses and to better map economic changes 
and technocratic preferences. At present, 
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we find that a significant part of the explanation for the contextual differences 
between countries can be accounted for by the varying political cultures, spe- 
cifically the legacy of communist authoritarian experiences. This interpretation helps to 
explain the country variations presented in descriptive analysis and is in line with in-
depth case studies of citizen attitudes in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Bulgaria is still struggling to free itself from party-based rule inherited from 
communism, including corrupt clientelistic structures, and its citizens are still highly 
apprehensive of politicians and political party rule (Chiru and Gherghina 2012; 
Dobrinsky 2000; Genov and Krŭsteva 2001; Wight and Fox 1998). In the Czech 
Republic, where the culture of ‘non-political poli- tics’ has been entrenched since the 
overturning of communism, there is a deep suspicion of excessively partisan leaders 
(Ehl 2009; Hanley 2013; Hloušek and Kopeček 2014). As Morlino aptly summarises, 
‘Memories of repressive patterns and action can continue to inhibit political discourse, 
political participation and individual notions of political efficacy, associability and trust’ 
(2010: 509–510).20 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The relationship between technocracy and democracy is increasingly being 
debated in the academic literature, but so far less work has assessed how the two 
stand in the eyes of the citizens. This article has attempted to fill this gap, offering a 
comparative analysis of factors that influence attitudes towards the technocratic 
mode of governance, as represented by experts making policy decisions instead of 
elected officials. Our analysis has shown a consistent story. Citizens are more inclined 
to show support for the technocratic mode of gov- ernance when they have weaker 
democratic attitudes and are distrustful of their politicians and representative 
institutions, either in themselves, or because of structural factors such as corruption 
or political culture. 
While more work would be required to test the impact of these factors through 
time and especially to compare attitudinal developments as new tech- nocratic 
governments are appointed in Europe, the results obtained so far pro- vide novel 
evidence on what influences citizens’ approach to unelected experts and can help 
explain the popular resistance to technocrats in Greece, while remaining more 
optimistic about technocratic appointments in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and, 
more recently, Romania. Further, this article has helped to clarify some of the 
contradictions found in the stealth democracy and pop- ulism literature. Our results 
support the idea that more distrustful and less politically interested citizens are 
more likely to approve of the delegation of decision-making to experts. At the same 
time, though independent experts can be considered part of a ‘knowledge elite’, in the 
eyes of the citizens they stand in sharp contrast with the political elites and current 
political establishment. A final important contribution stems from the intriguing 
contextual country effects on attitudes towards technocracy, where we find that a 
political culture 
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shaped by the experience of authoritarian party-based rule reinforces positive attitudes 
towards technocracy. 
Finally, we wish to address an important point about the nature of techno- cratic 
attitudes. We have sought to explain citizen attitudes towards technocracy through their 
beliefs regarding the merits of representative democracy as a regime, as well as their 
assessment of the trustworthiness and operation of their current political system. Such 
political attitudes are not formulated in isola- tion, but are in constant interaction 
with each other. It is possible that citizens’ belief in the merits of representative 
democracy entails their beliefs about the potential benefits and dangers of 
alternative regimes. Influences do not run solely in one direction and in the present 
observational study we do not claim to determine causal effects. However, we argue 
that given the heightened levels of frustration citizens are expressing towards their 
democratic systems and the mounting pressures placed upon representative democratic 
institutions at the national level, citizen distrust and historical legacies that form 
national political culture can help us better understand how citizens approach such 
alternative modes of governing in addition to their beliefs about representative 
democracy. 
Technocracy is primarily evaluated in relation to the current political system in 
European countries ‒ that is, representative democracy ‒ and preferences for 
unelected, non-partisan politics are motivated by the perception that party 
democracy fails to fulfil its function (Mair 2008). While we cannot, for rea- sons 
of data availability, provide a more specific analysis of what failings of democracy 
influence citizens’ attitudes towards technocracy, these results have significant 
implications for debates on the quality of democracies and citizens’ political 
engagement. In particular, the importance of trust in political institu- tions and in 
democracy as a whole has been shown once again to be an impor- tant feature of 
democratic life, with distrustful citizens being more likely to turn their attention – and 
potentially votes – away from representative democracy. Recent studies of citizen 
attitudes during the euro crisis have already shown how economic contraction and 
austerity policies have impacted on citizen trust and satisfaction with democracy 
(Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). We would expect that post-2008, 
socioeconomic developments, the experience of technocratic appointments in 
many European nations and their outputs will increase polarisation between 
complete support and complete rejection of technocracy, adding to the societal 
divisions and populist challenges observed in strained representative democracies and 
political parties across the board. 
 
Notes 
1. European countries that experienced technocratic governments prior to 2008 include 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Romania (McDonnell 
and Valbruzzi, 2014). It is worth noting that these technocratic experiences varied 
in terms of composition (fully technocratic, technocratic- led), mandate (caretaker, 
full mandate) and duration. 
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2. For a comprehensive literature review, see Font et al. (2015). The present article will 
leave the question of direct democracy aside, and concentrate on expert- driven 
political decision-making, i.e. technocracy, but recognises that these two pressures 
on traditional representative democracy may stem from citizens’ frustration with 
representational and institutional democratic shortcomings. 
3. Clearly there are different actors behind the common name ‘EU’ but often in 
citizens’ minds these are all conflated in one category, the EU. 
4. This relationship between attitudes towards the EU and technocracy may have shifted 
since the advent of the euro crisis, but the available data capture attitudes in the preceding 
period. 
5. Although we do recognise that, in a political culture of increased permissiveness towards 
corruption, businessmen and the private sector may be as corrupt as politicians and 
public officials, this hypothesis is motivated by the idea that citizen exposure to 
corrupt elected officials undermines the appeal of electoral democracy. 
6. The survey question on technocratic preference was asked only in the 1999 and 2008 
EVS. We use the 2008 data for our main analysis and repeat the analysis on the 1999 
dataset as a robustness check. Full robustness tests are available in the online 
appendix. 
7. This is similar to the question used as a proxy for stealth democracy, which is ‘our 
government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, independent 
experts rather than politicians’ (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). This item was also 
used in studies of populist attitudes as part of an elitism scale (Akkerman et al. 2014; 
Hawkins et al. 2012). 
8. It is however useful to recall that the literature on technocracy spans from the 
analysis of experts taking power in dictatorships or semi-dictatorships outside 
Europe (Ward 1998; Xiao 2003) to technocrats within international 
administrations such as the European Union (Radaelli 1999; Stie 2013; William 
2000), to independent agencies and bodies such as central banks (Freeman  2002). 
9. Non-response levels by country are reported in the Appendix. We report results using 
multiple imputation (following Rubin 1987, 1996), but find no substantial differences 
through other methods of dealing with non-response (unconditional mean imputation or 
listwise deletion). 
10. In the robustness checks, we have tested both measures of ‘Satisfaction with 
Democracy’ and ‘Evaluations of National Governments’ as two alternative ways of 
measuring satisfaction with the current workings of democracy, yet these measures 
are more contingent in the current workings of political systems and are not as 
powerful in predicting attitudes to technocracy. 
11. The precise wording of all variables and descriptive statistics can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
12. Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix 2 show distributions of technocratic attitudes in 1999 
and a comparison between 1999 and 2008. Differences in the percentage of 
respondents who register positive attitudes towards technocracy range from 0 to 10 per 
cent, yet the country ordering remains relatively stable. It is worth looking at the case 
of Romania, which experienced a technocratic government between the two EVS 
waves (Isarescu’s technocratic-led partisan cabinet was formed in November 1999 
and lasted for 12 months) and while the percentage of respondents with favourable 
technocratic attitudes fell from 84.7 to 74 per cent between the two waves, there are 
still widespread positive attitudes towards technocracy in the country in 2008. 
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13. We include one country-level variable in each step due to the high correlations 
between country-level variables (correlations between country-level variables are 
available in the online appendix). Models with additional operationalisations of 
countries’ economic performance are not presented here, but are available in the 
online appendix). 
14. Overall in the EVS2008 sample trust in the EU is correlated with the political trust 
index at Pearson’s coefficient r = 0.431. The strongest correlation is found in the 
Maltese dataset (r = 0.656), although in most other national samples the association 
remains moderate. 
15. The ‘Berkeley Mafia’ in Indonesia, the ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile, and Marcos’ 
‘Pillars’ in the Philippines. 
16. Under the broad umbrella of neo-liberal policies one can include macro- 
economic stabilisation and occasionally structural reforms, including 
privatisation and liberalisation. 
17. We also tested for the occurrence of scandals as an alternative operationalisation of 
corruption, but found no significant results. More information available in the online 
appendix. 
18. We have tested for the effect of national unemployment, unemployment rate change, 
GDP growth change, government budget deficit, economic inequality, as well as the 
occurrence of a banking, currency or budget crisis. Results are available in the 
online appendix. 
19. Further analyses with an alternative operationalisation for technocratic 
government experience based on McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014) is available in the 
online appendix. 
20. Though we have not articulated expectations for the influence of right-wing 
authoritarian experiences, a converse argument could be made for countries that 
experienced recent right-wing dictatorships, which can fuel citizen suspicion of non-
political actors. In our data, the number of countries available make such an analysis 
difficult and both the bivariate association between experience of military 
dictatorship and technocratic attitudes and the inclusion of this as a country-level 
independent variable are negative, but fail to reach statistical significance. The cases 
of Greece (and Cyprus) fit this explanation particularly well. The Greek military-
based authoritarian experience of the junta between 1967 and 1974, which 
culminated in a bloody student uprising and the Turkish invasion of the island of 
Cyprus, has left a complex legacy and widespread suspicion of non-democratically 
elected political rule (Sotiropoulos 2010). 
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Appendix 1. Key variables and measures 
Dependent Variable: ‘Attitudes towards technocracy’ is a single-item question with non-
response rate per country between 3.3% and 28% (average 12%). Non-response was dealt 
with using multiple imputation (following Rubin 1987, 1996). Four-category variable: M = 
2.57 SD = 0.93, lowest Greece (M = 1.66, SD = 0.87), highest Bulgaria (M = 3.25, SD = 
0.66). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of technocratic attitudes (eVs 1999). 
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‘Attitudes towards democracy’ is an index of four items, measured on a scale of 
1‒4 where higher values represent stronger democratic attitudes. The index scores 
high in reliability (Chronbach’s a = 0.727) and uses the following four items: 
‘I’m going to read some things that people sometimes say about a democratic 
political system. After I read each one could you please tell me if you agree 
strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with it?’(1 Agree strongly, 2 Agree, 3 
Disagree, 4 Disagree strongly) 
Item 1: Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of govern- ment 
(Recoded). 
Item 2: In democracy, the economic system runs badly. 
Item 3: Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling. Item 4: 
Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order. 
‘Political trust’ is measured using three items: confidence in political parties, in national 
government and in national parliament. The index is measured on a scale of 0‒1, with higher 
values representing higher trust in representative political institutions, and has a high reliability 
(Chronbach’s a = 0.823). 
We use standard survey items for ‘Trust in the EU’, ‘political interest’, ‘left‒right-wing 
ideology’. For the controls we use the respondents’ gender, age and level of education 
measured using the respondents’ age when they completed their education. We tried 
alternative measures such as educational attainment with 8 and 13 categories and they all 
yielded the same results. 
Country-level variables: 2008 CPI index, available at http://www.transparency.org, 2008 GDP per 
capita and 2008 unemployment available at http://www.data.worldbank.org. We also tested 
alternative measures of corruption, such as occurrence of scandals. 
We have calculated the number of scandals that have taken place in each of the 27 
European states between 2007 and 2008, following the coding scheme used in Kumlin and 
Esaiasson (2012). Whether a scandal happened in that period is reported with a 0‒1 dummy. 
The variable was not significant, probably due the fact that scandals are ‘one-off ’ events, 
which might influence the voter insofar as s/he will trust a particular party or individual 
politician less, but, unless the scandals are recurrent, they will not have a lasting effect on the 
overall attitude of citizens towards their democracy. 
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Appendix 2. Distribution of technocratic attitudes in 1999 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2. comparing positive attitudes towards technocracy (1999–2008). 
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Appendix 3. Probability plots for the effects of democratic 
attitudes, political trust and trust in the EU 
 
 
 
Figure A3. effect of democratic attitudes, political trust and trust in the eu on 
attitudes towards technocracy. 
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